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Abstract
We lay the foundations for a blockchain scheme, whose consensus is reached via a
proof of work algorithm based on the solution of consecutive discrete logarithm prob-
lems over the point group of elliptic curves. In the considered architecture, the curves
are pseudorandomly determined by block creators, chosen to be cryptographically se-
cure and changed every epoch. Given the current state of the chain and a prescribed
set of transactions, the curve selection is fully rigid, therefore trust is needed neither
in miners nor in the scheme proposers.
1 Introduction
A proof of work (PoW) is a procedure that allows a prover to demonstrate that he is very
likely to having performed a specific amount of computational work within a prescribed
interval of time [34].
This concept has been formalized in 1999 [28], although previous instances of delaying
functions conceived for similar purposes had appeared earlier [3, 12, 18, 20, 25, 29, 42].
Since 2008, PoW-methods have been attracting a considerable interest as Bitcoin [38]
introduced a PoW-based consensus algorithm, which puts miners in competition for solv-
ing a cryptographic challenge. Bitcoin’s consensus relies on a hashcash system [4, 5],
whose workload may be easily adjusted with a fastly verifiable output. Despite their high
efficiency and easy implementation, all the hashcash-based protocols share a common lim-
itation: the huge amount of computations employed by nodes becomes useless after the
consensus is reached. This aspect has been raising environmental concerns and many
solutions have been proposed to reduce these energy-intensive computer calculations.
A promising countermeasure to this issue is the adoption of bread pudding protocols
[28]. They face the aforementioned problem by performing a computational work that is
reusable either for practical [17, 19, 37, 47], cryptographical [28, 41] or mathematical [52]
reasons. Moreover, the latter class of systems encloses several protocols that are meant to
be research propellants [6], namely designed to boost the commitment upon the solution
of difficult mathematical problems.
Along the same line, we have proposed [33] a blockchain architecture with a PoW-
consensus algorithm based on the solution of the Discrete Logarithm Problem over the
point groups of elliptic curves (ECDLP). In this work, we provide that germinal proposal
with precise mathematical foundations and further implementation details.
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The idea of basing the PoW on ECDLP has already appeared in other works [27, 30],
as this problem is widely studied and applied in cryptographic protocols. However, the
considered curves does not usually fulfil the standard security criteria [7], especially for
what concerns the fully rigidity : the network has to initially trust an authority that is
providing the curve parameters.
In this work we radically solve this issue by designing a PoW-system based on elliptic
curves that are changing over the time. Since the curves are pseudo-randomly constructed
and satisfy general security conditions, a malicious user could attack the chain only by
breaking the ECDLP for an immense class of elliptic curves, which is currently considered
infeasible.
This paper is organized as follows: after a quick summary of the ECDLP in Section 2,
we deline the proposed blockchain architecture in Section 3 and its blocks construction in
Section 3.1 and 3.2. The strong points of this system are discussed in Section 4, including
a theorem on the security of our system, while in Section 5 future work directions are
suggested.
2 ECDLP
The ECDLP is a renown problem that consists of finding an integer N ∈ N such that the
N -th multiple of a base point P of an elliptic curve E over a finite field equals another
given point Q, i.e. Q = N · P .
Here we are only interested in elliptic curves over prime fields Fp and determined by
their short Weierstrass equation y2 = x3 + Ax + B. Solving ECDLP for a curve E over
large fields is considered to be a difficult challenge except for degenerate cases.
2.1 The general case
Currently the best known general attacks are Baby-Step Giant-Step [46] and Pollard’s
Rho - Kangaroo algorithms [40], which have an asymptotic complexity of O(
√
|E|), where
|E| is the size of E. These are general parallel collision-finding algorithms, which work
over any groups, i.e. no properties of the underlying structure but the operation definition
are used.
The introduction of Semaev’s polynomials [45] have suggested the existence of subex-
ponential algorithms to solve ECDLP, however no clear evidence has emerged. Pairings-
based attacks [22, 36], Index calculus [2, 32, 49] and Xedni calculus [48] have been recently
being studied, but none of them seem to significantly reduce the problem complexity of
the general case, so far.
2.2 Special cases
There are some families of curves whose ECDLP is known to be easier than the general
case, namely there are algorithm for efficiently solving it. Consequently, these curves have
to be carefully avoided for designing a ECDLP-based protocol. The following is a concise
summary of those particular attacks, the curve on which they may be efficiently applied
and how we avoid them.
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Attack It applies on curves To avoid it: use Ref.
Weil-descent over composite fields prime fields [21, 24]
Polig-Hellman of composite orders prime orders [39]
Semaev, Satoh-Araki, Smart anomalous non-anomalous curves [44, 43, 50]
Menezes-Okamoto-Vanstone low embedding degree high embedding degree [36]
Frey-Ru¨ck low embedding degree high embedding degree [22]
Wiener-Zuccherato low CM discriminant high CM discriminant [53]
3 A sample blockchain architecture
To show how our PoW works, we introduce a schematic sample ledger architecture, but
our algorithm may easily be adapted for any blockchain scheme. Our architecture is based
on two types of blocks:
[EB] An Epoch Block contains, aside from the header and a list of transactions, a prime
number p, an elliptic curve E defined over Fp and a base point P of E, all to be
determined by the proposing miner.
Moreover, it encloses as PoW two integer N1 and N2 ∈ {0, . . . , |E| − 1} to be dis-
covered by the proposing miner such that Ni · P are points of E deterministically
determined from the header of the block.
These EBs occur once every 2016 blocks in the blockchain.
[SB] The Standard Blocks are just a light version of the EB blocks, they are constructed
in the same way except for p, E, P , which are inherited from the last EB block of
the chain.
SBs constitute the vast majority of the blocks of the chain.
[EB]
p,E, P
PoW
Data
#0
[SB]
PoW
Data
#1
[SB]
PoW
Data
#2015
[EB]
p′, E′, P ′
PoW′
Data
#2016
[SB]
PoW′
Data
#2017
. . . . . .
EBs basically define the setting (curves and base points) on which the discrete loga-
rithm PoWs will have to be solved in the following epoch. They are slightly heavier to
be produced and verified but occur rarely (roughly once every two weeks with a BTC-like
difficulty adjustment).
In order to give the specifications of our blocks we need a deterministic function P_Gen
to construct a point on a given elliptic curve E from a prescribed hash digest h, which we
treat as an integer for simplicity. The following is a concrete example of such a function.
function P_Gen(h,E)
i = 0
while #{ points of E with x-coord = h + i} = 0:
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i = i + 1
P = (h + i, *) point of E with 0 ≤ * < p/2
return P
We notice that the points determined by the above function are affine by construction.
The hash H that we propose to use in the following is SHA3-512 [8], which provides a sat-
isfying collision resistance even against post-quantum attacks, but one might conceivably
replace it with another properly constructed one.
We also assume that all proposing miners use prescribed signature algorithms and we
denote with σk(m) the signature of the string m obtained by the miner with signing key
k.
3.1 Standard Blocks
A minimal model of a SB consists of a list of valid transactions and a header, which
comprises their Merkel rootM, the hash of the previous header hprev and a pair of integers
(N1, N2) solving
PoW :
{
P_Gen(H(hprev), E) = N1 · P,
P_Gen(H(M), E) = N2 · P.
where E and P are defined in the last EB.
[SB]
h = H(new header)
PoW : (N1, N2)
hprev M
New transactions
T1 T2 · · · Tk
3.2 Epoch Blocks
An EB is a thick version of a SB, namely it is constructed in a similar fashion but it
enclodes three additional data: the prime p, the elliptic curve E over Fp and the base
point P of E.
• Generating p
The prime number p is the responsible of the expected run time of the PoW. Its
size is determined by the difficulty parameter d, whose tuning depends on the block
production ratio that a designer wants to obtain. Therefore we do not discuss the
choice of d but we refer to the BTC implementation [9] or to more structured models
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such as personalized difficulty adjustments [14]. Our goal is to produce a prime
number of the prescribed size and satisfying the following properties.
EXCEPTIONALITY PROPERTIES
1. p is not a Crandall prime [16], i.e. not of the from 2k−c for a relatively small
and positive integer c.
2. p is neither a Generalized Mersenne prime [51] nor a More Generalized
Mersenne prime [15], i.e. it may not be written as p(m) for some integer
m and polynomial p with very small coefficients and number of monomials.
3. p is not Montgomery-friendly [1, 26, 10], i.e. it may not be obtained as
2α(2β − γ) − 1 for small positive integers α, β, γ.
Given the difficulty parameter d and the hash of the previous header h, we propose
the generation of such a prime number p as follows.
function p_Gen(d, h)
repeat
h = H(h)
p = NextPrime(h mod 22d)
until p satisfies exceptionality properties
return p
• Generating E
We aim at generating pseudorandom elliptic curves for which no efficient attacks are
currently known, i.e. satisfying the following properties.
SECURITY PROPERTIES
1. The number of points of E is prime and different from p.
2. The embedding degree B is greater than 20, i.e. |E| ∤ pB − 1 for every
1 ≤ B ≤ 20.
3. Let D be the CM field discriminant, defined as
D =
{
∆ if ∆ ≡ 1 mod 4,
4∆ otherwise,
∆ = SquareFreePart(t2 − 4p),
where t is the trace of E. Then we require D > 240.
Let h be the previous block header, we suggest to generate the curve as follows.
function E_Gen(p, h)
i = 0
repeat
i = i + 1
AE = H(h + i)
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BE = H(AE)
E defined by y2 = x3 +AEx+BE over Fp
until E is an EC satisfying security properties
return E
• Generating P
The base point we prescribe for an EB and its subsequent epoch is
P = P_Gen(H(p || AE || BE), E).
The new epoch parameters are manufactured before the PoW production, which there-
fore depends on them.
[EB]
Epoch Data
p = p_Gen (d, hprev) E = E_Gen (p, hprev)
P = P_Gen (H(p || AE || BE), E)
h = H(new header)
PoW : (N1, N2)
hprev M
New transactions
T1 T2 · · · Tk
Despite the verification of SBs is extremely fast, EBs are slower to be checked since
verifiers need to test that all the curve parameters involved have been properly constructed,
running several types of mathematical algorithms such as primality testing, finite fields
operations and points counting.
4 Method discussion
Here we discuss motivation and advantages of the presented choices.
First, this PoW model involves many different mathematical algorithms of wide inter-
est, for which this blockchain may represent a concrete research propellant. Furthermore,
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it might also provides a public collection of cryptographically secure elliptic curves of
moderate size.
Apart from its scientific usefulness, it conveys many desirable security properties. The
challenges involved do not rely on a given curve of questionable provenance but on the
generic difficulty of the ECDLP, which is much more fair to be trusted. Thus, we find it
aims at embracing the decentralization ideals that lead to cryptocurrencies creation: even
the mathematical objects involved are publicly manufactured, no trust is required even in
the authors or the proposing entities.
The existence of different types of block in blockchains has become common, as it is
considered suitable for tackling the problem of scalability [35].
As for blocks forgery, we point out that both SBs and EBs comprise a PoW which
depends on the entire block, together with the previous one. This means that any coun-
terfeit in any position of the chain results into an incorrect final block, which may be easily
detected from the network.
Moreover, it is hard to conceive shortcuts for the PoW production: for a given diffi-
culty parameter d we expect a d-bits secutity of the general ECDPL by using p ≈ 22d,
unless attacks outperforming Pollard’s rho are discovered. Moreover, common base field
operations speed ups are avoided by making use of not-exceptional primes, ensuring a fair
and general problem to be solved equally for every miner. In fact, neither specific algo-
rithms nor dedicated hardware may be used for solving such a general problem, of which
easy cases are carefully avoided. Also, the constructed curves fulfil the known security
criteria [7]:
• working over prime fields avoids Weil-descent attacks;
• searching for curves of prime order prevents from Polig-Hellman attacks;
• since p 6= |E| the curves are not anomalous so Smart, Semaev, Satoh-Araki attacks
do not apply;
• the embedding degree we suggest is greater than 20 as required by SEC1 [13], which
prevents pairing attacks such as Menezes-Okamoto-Vanstone (based on Weil Pairing)
and Frey-Ru¨ck (based on Tate-Lichtenbaum Pairing);
• attacks to curves with low CM discriminant are prevented by requiring it higher
than 240, as for Brainpool Standard Curves [31].
Theorem 4.1. Let us assume that the current epoch is endowed with the curve E and its
base-point P . Let σ be a deterministic digital signature algorithm and M be a proposing
miner with fixed signing key k. If M exhibits a valid block, then it has solved at least one
generic instance of ECDLP on E.
Proof. By definition of our PoW, the given block is valid if and only if it contains (N1, N2)
such that {
Q1 = P_Gen(H(σk(hprev)), E) = N1 · P,
Q2 = P_Gen(H(M), E) = N2 · P.
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Since E and P are determined by the epoch and hprev is determined by the previous
block, the proposing miner has no control on them. Moreover, σ is deterministic and k is
fixed, so Q1 = P_Gen(H(σk(hprev)), E) cannot be influenced by the miner. Therefore the
miner must solve Q1 = N1 · P .
Remark 4.2. Even if in the previous proof we do not consider the equation Q2 = N2 ·P ,
we believe that it adds extra security. Indeed, it is unlikely that a miner can avoid solving
Q2 = N2 · P unless M has computed a multiple of P with any m, Q¯ = mP , and solved the
hash preimage equation H(M) = x, where x is the x-coordinate of Q¯.
Besides security, the curves we propose are fully rigid as defined in [7]: their construc-
tion is entirely explained in terms of the previous block, which cannot be controlled by a
malicious actor since there is no room for miner choices (such as nonces). Even assuming
that the transactions of the previous block might be chosen ad hoc, an attacker who wants
to impose a particular curve during the next epoch has to brute-force invert the hash H at
the cost of one ECDLP solution for each attempt, until a desired hash digest is obtained,
within the time needed for the entire network to solve a single ECDLP. We consider this
scenario unachievable under realistic assumptions.
As regards the difference between EBs and SBs, we point out that the bulk of miner’s
work consists of the ECDLP solution: we expect good parameters to be generated in EBs
in a time which is linear in the difficulty parameter [23] whereas the asymptotic difficulty
of ECDLP solution is exponential in it.
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Since the curves creation appears not to be computationally demanding when com-
pared to the actual PoW, then lazy miners do not have any substantial advantage in
skipping it.
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5 Conclusion
We have proposed a new PoW-based blockchain model based on general ECDLP, high-
lighting the desirable properties that such a scheme provides in terms of scientific relevance,
security and pure decentralization ideals.
The past proposals [27, 30] have the high merit of introducing ECDLP as a problem
whose solution provides consensus, but we felt compelled to remove the suspiscious choice
of the curve serving as a common battlefield for miners.
It may be interesting to produce an actual implementation of the proposed scheme,
obtaining practical time measurments and efficiency considerations. A subsequent engag-
ing project might address the resistance of such a protocol to the known attacks under
real-world assumptions, comparing the obtained results with outcomes of existing cryp-
tocurrencies. Further studies may also be carried on other types of curve models, such as
Edwards or Montgomery curves. Even though this is likely to improve the overall perfor-
mance of this scheme, it should be observed that it contrasts with our declared intention
of making use of general objects.
Finally, different types of PoW might be conceived in a similar fashion, possibly em-
ploying problems which are thought to resist even to quantum attacks.
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